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SHELLEDY

Defendants, Respondents.
Pursuant
Appellant
Eric P.

to Rule

Utah Rules

of Appellate

Procedure,

E. D. Shelledy, by and through his attorney of record,
Hartman, respectfully

rehearing

of its

April 14, 1992.
fact

35,

which

opinion

petitions

in the

the Court

to grant

above-captioned appeal

a

dated

This Petition attempts to state points of law or

Shelledy

believes

the

Court

has

overlooked

or

misapprehended.
POINT

I .

THE COURT HAS OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED
THE FACTUAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN KEMMERER AND
THIS CASE •- THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT AS GRANTOR TO SHELLEDY.
The

Court

distinction

has

failed

between this

to address

case

723 F.2d 54 (10th Cir. 1983).

the

and Kemmerer
In Kemmerer,

important
Coal

factual

Co. v.

BYU,

the 10th Circuit was

dealing with a situation involving only private parties and their
1

property rights.
with

a

In the

situation

instant action; the

involving

the

federal

Court is

government

dealing
and

its

grantee, Shelledy.
This

factual difference

least two respects:
the property,
not

be

First, because the

under federal

applied to

whether it

from Kemmezfer

the

was sound law

is important

federal government owned

law the limitations

government's
under the

in at

statutes could

grantee, irrespective
fact}s of Kemmerer.

of

See,

Appellant's Brief, Point IV, pp. 14-15.
Second,
over

the

it deprived

property while

Administration (hereafter

Salt Lake
title

Courtty of

rested

any jurisdiction

in the

Small

Business

SBA). See, Appellant's Reply

Brief,

Point III, pp. 6-8.
Because of the Court's apparent
discussion

is needed

impermissibility

regarding

of applying

federal government's

basis for its ruling, more

the first

a

statute bf

point,

that of

the

limitations to

the

grantee to include tti-me during which title

was in the federal government.
This Court
tax sale
under

apparently accepts the conclusion

of the property

while title

the authority of United

61 S.Ct.

1011, 85

could run

against

Clearly,

the

L.ed. 1327

facts

wa£ in the

SBA was

States v. Alabama,
(1940), and

the SBA

because of

of

case

this

that the 1984

parameters of the Alabama holding.

2

that

313 U.S. 274,
no limitations

i^s sovereign

fall

void

squarely

immunity.

within

the

However, it

appears to be the Court's

the limitations period could

ruling that although

not run against the SBA

while they

held title to the property, Shelledy may not assert that point to
prove

his

chain of

title

espoused in Kemmerer and

because

of

the

standing

doctrine

that, therefore, the limitations period

ran as to Shelledy even while the property was owned by the SBA.
Slip Op. at p. 5.
Although
legitimate
device

Shelledy

issue

in

believes

that

Kemmerer, but

standing

merely

an

was

not

a

issue-avoidance

invoked by the 10th Circuit to side-step a more difficult

Constitutional issue (when a

due process claim may be

barred by

limitations), it is clear that under well-established federal law
neither standing nor any
deprive

other legal construct can be

the federal government's

transferred

property, since

grantee of

this

impinges

his rights
on the

rights to manage and dispose of its property.

raised to
to the

sovereign's

Redfield v. Parks,

132 U.S. 239, 33 L.ed. 327 (1889); Simmons v. Ogle, 105 U.S. 271,
26 L.ed. 1087 (1881); Oaksmith v. Johnston, 92 U.S. 343, 23 L.ed.
682 (1875);
534

(1871);

(1832).

Gibson v. Chouteau, 13
Lindsev v.

Wall [80 U.S.] 92,

Miller's Lessee,

6

Pet [31

Specifically, no limitations period may run

grantee, except that

which may

begin and fully

20 L.ed.
U.S.] 666

against the

run its

course

after the government conveys

legal title to the property.

Appellant's Brief, Point IV,

pp. 14-15; Simmons v. Ogle, supra.

To

be to allow the

conclude otherwise would

impermissible

burden

on

the

property rights
3

See,

county to place an
of

the

federal

government which only the express consent of Congress may
This

allow.

is a fundamental tenet of sovereign immunity which has been

recognized in this country since McCulloch v. Maryland.
In
was

Simmons v. Ogle, suprar

faced with a dispute

the United States Supreme Court

between a party

(Ogle) who admittedly

possessed property for over thirty years versus a party (Simmons)
who claimed title
States.

through a

subsequent patent

from the

United

The Court stated:
As regards the weight to be given to the
possession of Ogle, it is to be considered
that whether he had the equitable right or
not, neither the Statute of Limitations nor
the equitable doctrine of lapse of time could
begin to have effect against any one until
Simmons purchased of the United States and
obtained his patent in 1874, for up to that
time the legal title was undeniably in the
United States. If this had not been so Ogle
would have successfully pleaded the Statute
of Limitations against Simmons in the action
at law.
No laches could be imputed to
Simmons, who brought suit very soon after he
received his patent.
Nor can laches be
imputed to the United States, either as a
matter of law or on any moral or equitable
principles.

IdL, at 105 U.S. 273.
Perhaps

the

seminal

case

establishing

the

absolute

prohibition on a State's attempt to infringe on the rights of the
government's
from

grantee to the full enjoyment of the title acquired

the federal sovereign is

U.S.] 92,

20 L.Ed.

Gibson v. Chouteau. 13 Wall. [80

534 (1871).

Supreme Court, when confronted with
statute

divested title

from

the

In Gibson,

the United

States

the claim that a limitations
federal government's

prior to legal title being conveyed, stated:

grantee

It is a matter of common knowledge that
statues of limitation do not run against the
State. That no laches can be imputed to the
king, and that no time can bar his rights,
was the maxim of the common law, and was
founded on the principle of public policy,
that as he was occupied with the cares of
government he ought not to suffer from the
negligence of his officers and servants. The
principle is applicable to all governments,
which must necessarily act through numerous
agents, and is essential to a preservation of
the interests and property of the public. It
is upon this principle that in this country
the statutes of a State prescribing periods
within which rights must be prosecuted are
not held to embrace the State itself, unless
it is expressly designated or the mischiefs
to be remedied are of such a nature that it
must necessarily be included. As legislation
of a State can only apply to persons and
things over which the State has jurisdiction,
the United States
are also
necessarily
excluded from the operation of such statutes.
[Citations omitted.]
With
respect to the public domain, the
Constitution vests in Congress the power of
disposition and of making all needful rules
and regulations. That power is subject to no
limitations. Congress has the absolute right
to prescribe the times, the conditions, and
the mode of transferring this property, or
any part of it, and to designate the persons
to whom the transfer shall be made. No State
legislation can interfere with this right or
embarrass its exercise; ....
Id. at 13 Wall [80 U.S.] 99 [emphasis added].
The United States Supreme Court in Gibson went on to address
the needed protection of the government's grantee:
The same principle which forbids any State
legislation interfering with the power of
Congress to dispose of the public property of
the
United
States,
also
forbids
any
legislation depriving the grantees of the
United States of the possession and enjoyment
of the property granted.... The consummation
5

of the title is not a matter which the
grantees can control, but one which rests
entirely with the government. With the legal
title, when transferred, goes the right to
possess and enjoy the land, |and it would
amount to a denial of the power of disposal
in Congress if these benefits, which should
follow upon
the acquisition of that title,
could be forfeited because tjhev were not
asserted before that title was issued.
Id. at 13 Wall [80 U.S.] 100 [emphasis added].
The Court

concluded

disposition of
State

that

the

federal properties

legislation, no matter how

power of

Congress

cannot be defeated
asserted.

Id.

in

the

under any

at 13 Wall [80

U.S.] 103-104.
Similarly,
(1889),

in Redfield v. Parks, 132 U.S. 239, 33 L.ed. 327

the United States Supreme Court rejected any notion that

limitations could defeat the
in

managing and

authority of the federal government

disposing of its

Lindsev v. Miller's Lessee, 6 Pet.
on at

property interests.

Accord,

[31 U.S.] 666 (1832).

least two occasions, Utah's Supreme Court

Also,

has recognized

the binding authority of Gibson and Redfield in this State. See,
Utah Copper Co. v. Eckman, 47 Utah 165, 152 P. 178 (1915); Steele
v. Bolev, 7 Utah 64, 24 P. 755 (1890).
As to the
between Kemmerer
only the

second legal result

of the factual

difference

and the

instant case, Petitioner

will restate

basic thrust of

the point, refetring the

court to the

discussion in his Briefs.
Since

Salt Lake

property, it was
under

any

County was

not an

without jurisdiction

authority which qould

circumstances, and

was, therefore,
6

over the

pass good

title

not within

the

permissible

scope

of

the

special

statutes

of

limitations

recognized by this Court in Hansen v. Morris, 3 Utah 2d. 310, 283
P.2d 884 (1955).
Thus,

See, Appellant's Brief, Point IV, pp. 11-14.

just

as the

above-cited cases
doctrines,

(or private

could not, by either

impinge

government's

States

or

restrict

authority to

manage

interests)

in the

legislation or equitable

in

any

way

and dispose

the

of its

federal
property

interests and its grantee's rights to receive the property absent
the express consent of Congress, neither Salt Lake County nor the
State of Utah,
or
all

through limitations statutes, standing

doctrine,

any other legal construct, may prevent the SBA from conveying
its right,

title and

Shelledy, nor bar

interest in

Shelledy from

the subject

the use and

property to

enjoyment of

that

property.
POINT I I .
THE TAX DEED WAS VOID, NOT MERELY VOIDABLE.
This Court states in its opinion that "The SBA may have been
able to avoid the 1984 tax
of

Alabama,

but

it did

sale of its property on the authority
not

attempt to

do

so."

This' is a

misapprehension of the law set forth in United States v. Alabama,
supra, and the impact on any legal obligation of the SBA.
The

Alabama

decision

factually indistinguishable
was void,

held

that

from the

the

tax

sale in the

sale

therein,

instant case,

not merely voidable, because the county therein lacked

jurisdiction over the property.

7

As stated in the trial court below and in briefs before this
Court, a void deed is a nullity, with no legal effect, as opposed
to

one which is

legal effect

merely voidable.

until

challenged

A

merely voidable

and may

be

statute of

limitations.

A deed

even carry

any basis of

title upon which a

may

Bennion Insurance Co. v.

rely.

deed has

strengthened

which is void, as

by a

here, cannot

bona fide purchaser

1st OK Corp., 571 P.2d 1339

(Utah 1977) .
The

United

supra, concluded

States Supreme
that short

Court,

in

Redfield v.

statutes of limitations

states to strengthen tax titles could not

Parksf

adopted by

apply to deeds void on

their face, reversing a state court ruling to the contrary.

Id.

at 132 U.S.

are

void

251-252.

Petitioner submits that

ab initio because

of a lack of

jurisdiction in the taxing

authority cannot be given life by such statutes.
v.

Utah Department

deeds which

of Transportation,

Support, Baxter

783 P.2d

1045 (UtahApp.

1989).
Thus,

the Court's statement that

aside the 1984 tax
to

the SBA chose

not to set

deed incorrectly assumes that the

SBA needed

take action against

a deed which

was void ab

any owner whose

initio.

burden does not

fall on

title has

been cut off by

such void deed, and certainly cannot

This

purportedly
be imposed

on the SBA without the consent of Congressf
POINT III.
THE LAW ON THIRD PARTY STANDING IS MET HEREIN.
Although

the Petitioner steadfastly
8

believes that standing

is

not a

legitimate issue

federal prohibitions

in

this case, both because

on states' abilities to

property rights, discussed above, and because

of the

impinge on federal
Shelledy does not

believe he is asserting the constitutional rights of another, but
merely proving his chain of title, Petitioner

believes the Court

has glossed over the application of the standards of assertion of
1us tertii when viewed under the facts of this case.
The Court states:
None of the above [three factors looked at]
are present in
the instant case.
No
substantial
relationship
exists
between
Shelledy and the SBA; the SBA has never been
precluded from asserting its immune status;
and finally, there has been no dilution of
Shelledy's constitutional rights.
Slip Op. at page 6.
It should first be noted that the three factors cited by the
court as the standard in allowing the assertion of what have been
termed 1us tertii third party rights issues are not a conjunctive
preliminary
appear in
cited

test, but

are merely

most of these

in each case.

three recurring

themes which

types of cases, and not all

three are

Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus

Tertii, 88 Harv. L.Rev. 423, 425 (1975).
As

regards

the

first

consideration to acquire

factor,

Shelledy

paid

valuable

all the SBA's right, title and interest

in the property in question and the SBA assumed it conveyed those
interests to

Shelledy.

Shelledy

cannot scarcely conceive

more substantial relationship between parties.

9

of a

In

fact, it

Lawrence

Tribe

is

precisely such

has

relationship"

jus

cited

as a

tertii cases

vendor-vendee status

large
which

sub-class
can

of

be more

that

"special
rationally

thought of as first-party rights cases, where a litigant seeks to
avoid restrictions which directly
with the
(2nd

third person.

ed.

Jackson,

1988).

(retailer

Tribe, American Constitutional Law §3-19

Such vendor-vendee

346 U.S.

restrictive

impair his freedom to interact

249 (1953)

covenants);

c^ses include

(white seller

Craig v.

Boren,

attacking sex-discriminating

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.

Barrows v.

attacking racially

429

beer

U.S. 190
sales

(1976)

laws);

and

438 (1972) (sale of contraceptives

to unmarried couples).
Similarly, Professor Henry Monaghan has viewed these vendorvendee cases as first-party rights cases, suggesting that the due
process

clause of

Constitution
resulting

the

protects

from

the

unjustified

persons with whom he
Standing, 84

14th

Amendment
litigant

to

against

discriminatipn

sought to interact.

Colum. L.Rev. 277 (1984)

the

United

States

economic

injury

against

Monaghan,

the

third

Third Party

atl 282, 297-299.

Such a

due process violation is suggested by the Court's opinion holding
that the SBA cannot

convey, and Shelledy bannot acquire,

all of

the SBA's right, title and interest in the property at issue.
As
title

to the second factor,
and interest

likelihood,

would

to
have

challenge had they been

the SBA conveyed

the property
itself

been

to

Shelledy and,
subject

a party to this action
10

all their right

to

a

in

all

standing

seeking to quiet

Shelledy's title.
assert its

Thus,

it would be

impossible for the SBA

own constitutional rights, because at the

presumed to have

no interest

in the property.

to

time they

Therefore,

the

second factor is also satisfied under the facts herein.
On the third point, if the
permitted

herein,

it is

assertion of 1us tertii were not

clear

that

the SBA's

constitutional

rights would be diluted to an impermissible degree.
opinion

states that

Shelledy's

diluted, but Petitioner
and that

constitutional

assumes this was a

the Court meant the

its property interests, which
law as stated
ruling
interest

to such

consent from
government
cloud on

with the

is no doubt

all its

of property,

onerous task

of the Court's
right, title and

and that,

of suing

even without

burden the federal
to remove

any such

their properties prior to disposing of them or face the
the local

valueless.

Such

government

unless

hasn't), and

a

title

government has rendered

burden cannot
Congress

not to

assert all rights
of

The end result

Congress, local governments may

prospect that

chain

There

the SBA's ability to alienate

SBA cannot convey

a piece

not

is contrary to established federal

above in Point I.

is that the

rights are

mere dictation error

SBA's rights.)

that this Court's ruling restricts

(The Court's

be

imposed on

expressly

allow the

federal government's grantee

to

rights.

11

it

federal
it

impermissibly

permits

the

(which

held by its grantor in
would

the properties

order to establish the

dilute

the

government's

POINT IV.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT'S RULING ARE UNTENABLE.
Although
purporting
Court

the Court

to be

is

relying on

interpreting

to disavow Kemmerer or

facts involved therein, or

a 10th

Utah law,

Circuit opinion

Petitioner urges

limit its holding

the

to the peculiar

acknowledge that that standard cannot

be applied in the instant action.
The current

opinion

of

this

Court

leads

to

some

very

troubling implications:
1.

A

government

state
how

or

it

local

must

government tnay tell

manage and

interests, even though such

dispose

the

of

its

power is plenary in the

federal
property

Congress of

the United States.
2.

A local

on, and convey by

taxing authority

may proceed to

tax deed, property which is

assess taxes

admittedly exempt

because owned by the United States, and subsequently declare that
the

United States' grantee has received nothing in its deed from

the United States.
3.
of

The Court's

Appeals'

decision

ruling impliedly overrules
in

Baxter

v. , Utah

the Utah Court
Department

of

Transportation, supraf since the ruling in that case required the
conclusion
property

that

a county

which

could not create valid

lacked

jurisdiction over

title through a

the

tax sale-under

any circumstance.
4.
in

the

Acceptance of Kemmerer's standing doctrine would result
following

unusual

situation:
12

Suppose

a

titleholder

receives no notice of an impending tax sale (a clear due
violation).

If the

sale either

dies

estate

or his

titleholder on the day

or conveys

his title

grantee cannot

clear their title because it was not

after the final

to a

raise the

process

third party,

due process

tax
his

issue and

their constitutional rights

which were violated.
5.

Under this Court's ruling, the SBA should be considered

a necessary party and joined in
the Utah
to

Rules of Civil Procedure.

the property

as against

authority of United States
holds

that the

because

this proceeding under Rule 19 of

of the

SBA

the void

convey

be joined

interests in

under Rule

the subject

that title

19

in order

to the

this Court

to

Shelledy

the SBA

and interest in the

property.

cannot be accorded Shelledy
so

Since

standing interpretation,

therefore retain some right, title
and must

tax deed pursuant

v. Alabama, supra.

could not

Court's

Clearly, the SBA held title

must

property

to adjudicate

Certainly,

all

complete relief

without the SBA's joinder.

This is

because the SBA purported to convey, and Shelledy presumed to

receive, all the SBA's right, title and interest in the property,
but this Court has now ruled that it did not, or could
such a complete conveyance.

This also subjects Shelledy

substantial risk of incurring
an

action to recover his

court could likely
right, title
necessary

and

not, make

inconsistent obligations, since in

consideration from the

hold that the SBA in fact
interest to

to the

Shelley.

SBA, a federal

did convey all its

Thus, the

SBA

is

a

party under Rule 19(a) and it should be ordered joined
13

as a party

so that complete relief may

be provided the parties.

Support, Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990.).
CONCLUSION
Petitioner believes
standing

theories

the Court

espoused

in

has too readily

the

Kemmerer

adopted the

case.

Under

established federal law, the Kemmerer rationale cannot be applied
to the facts

of this case

where a federal

rights and immunities of the United
property.
doctrines

No
may

legal
be

theory,

used

to

agency with all

States is the grantor of the

state

impair

statutes,

the

federal

authority to manage and dispose of its property.
of this case,
and

title to the property must

taxes assessed

during

the

ownership by

or

equitable

government's

Under the facts

be quieted in Shelledy
the

SBA and

paid

by

Shelledy under protest must be refunded.
Although

Petitioner is,

like this

potential impacts on local revenue bases,
appropriately,

Court, concerned

about

such concerns are most

and can only be, addressed to the Congress of the

Unites States.
Respectfully submitted this 2?ff day of April, 1992.
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